Abstract. If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences is restricted and standard social choice theorems do not apply. A substantial body of analysis, however, strongly supports the notion that attractive strategy-proof social choice functions do not exist in market settings. Yet price theory, which implicitly assumes the strategyproofness of markets, performs quite well in describing many real markets. This paper resolves this paradox in two steps. First, given that a market is not strategy-proof, it should be modeled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. Second, a double auction market, which is perhaps the simplest operationalization of supply and demand as a Bayesian game, is approximately strategy-proof even when the number of traders on each side of the market is quite moderate.
Introduction
Typically an intermediate microeconomics textbook de®nes the equilibrium price in a market as the price at which the supply and demand curves intersect, explaining that only at this price are both buyers and sellers satis®ed: no buyer wants to o¨er a higher price in order to purchase an additional unit and no seller wants to o¨er a lower price in order to sell an additional unit. If the price in the market is not at the equilibrium level, then either some buyer or some seller will ®nd it pro®table to bid a shade higher or o¨er a shade lower with the expectation that that change will permit it to trade additional units pro®tably.1 Consequently only at the equilibrium price does the market come to rest.
This story of market equilibrium does not mention ± in fact has no room for ± strategic behavior. Supply and demand curves are built up from individual preferences on the assumption that each buyer (or seller) takes price as given and chooses quantity conditional on that price. Thus strategic behavior in which a buyer underreports the number of units he is willing to purchase at a given price in order to manipulate the price at which trade occurs is a priori ruled out. Implicitly the textbook story assumes that trade in a market is strategy-proof, i.e., each trader has a dominant strategy to report his or her preferences truthfully.
A market, however, is not generally strategy-proof as the following example illustrates. For the moment, let the market have two participants, a buyer and a seller. The seller has a single, indivisible widget on which she places a cost of c A 0; 1. The buyer would like to buy the widget if he does not have pay more than the value v A 0; 1 he places on it. The values c and v are private information to the seller and buyer respectively. Finally, let the equilibrium price be found through a simple well de®ned, auction-like process.
Suppose, for speci®city, that v 0:8 and c 0:55. Since v > c e½ciency requires that trade take place. The auctioneer begins the process crying out a proposed price 0.5. The seller responds that she is unwilling to sell her widget at that price while the buyer responds that he is willing. Since excess demand exists in the market the auctioneer begins a process of raising the proposed price in increments of 0.1 until one of two events occurs: (i) the buyer and seller both accept the price and the market clears, or (ii) the buyer switches from accepting the proposed price p to rejecting it, in which case the auctioneer concludes that more than likely v g c, trade would be ine½cient, and the market should close without trade occurring. Upon announcing the new proposed price of 0.6, the buyer responds that he is willing to buy. The seller, however, has a problem in deciding how to respond. She in fact is willing to trade at 0.6, but if she does agree to trade at this price, then her gain is only 0.05 (the price less her cost c).2 She knows that the next price the auctioneer will cry out will be 0.7. Holding out for that price may be worthwhile, though it has the danger that the buyer will be unwilling to pay 0.7, an eventuality that would result in no trade because the auctioneer would incorrectly infer that v < c and close the market. Nevertheless the seller takes the risk, the auctioneer announces 0.7, both the buyer and seller accept the price, and trade occurs with the seller realizing gain of 0.15 and the buyer realizing gain of 0.1.
This example illustrates two fundamental points: First, traders in a market may have an incentive to act strategically: the seller netted an extra 0.1 gain at 1 See, for example, Frank (1991, p. 32±35) . 2 In the classical theory of ta Ãtonnement as introduced by Walras she would accept the price 0.55, for that theory assumes price taking behavior on the part of all traders. See Negishi (1989, p. 589±96) . the buyer's expense as a result of her strategic maneuver. Second, strategic behavior may result in ine½ciency. If the buyer's value had been 0.68 rather than 0.8, then the buyer would have surely rejected the price 0.7, the auctioneer would have closed the market, and the available gains from trade would have been lost as a result of the seller's maneuver.
Nothing about this example depends on the market consisting only of a single buyer and a single seller. Parallel examples are easily constructed for markets that have m buyers and m sellers ± call such a market a size m market ± in which each seller i has a one widget whose opportunity cost to her is c i A 0; 1 and each buyer j seeks one widget whose value to him is v j A 0; 1.
This example, showing the manipulability of a simple auction-like market, raises the following question: if market mechanisms that govern the setting of price are not strategy-proof, then why is supply and demand analysis (i.e., price theory) apparently so robust as an explanation for the prices that markets generate? The standard answer to this question, which text books introduce in their discussion of perfect competition, is that if the market is large in the sense of having many participants (none of whom is inordinately big), then no individual can signi®cantly a¨ect the price at which trade occurs. Therefore each trader is a price taker, has no incentive to misrepresent his or her preferences, and the market is strategy-proof. But this leaves open the question of how large does a market need be in order to be large, for strictly speaking an individual trader can a¨ect price even in a very large ®nite market. It is this last question, how large is large enough, that is the focus of my discussion here. My belief is that the answer I propose provides insight into the possibilities of``approximate'' strategy-proofness within market settings.
The argument that I make here depends on work that I have done with Aldo Rustichini and, especially, Steven Williams. It shows two things. First, if the text book concept of supply and demand is operationalized as a double auction under incomplete information within simple exchange markets of the sort used in the example above, then as the market size m increases the equilibrium strategic behavior in the market decreases rapidly towards zero. Speci®cally, if the market's size doubles, then the maximal amount by which any trader misrepresent's his cost/value is cut in half. This convergence of strategies to truth-telling implies that each time the market size is increased by a factor of two, then in relative terms the expected ine½ciency of the market decreases by a factor of four. Numerical examples suggest that an extremely good approximation to a large market may be obtained with a market of size m 8. Second, in a well de®ned sense, the double auction does as well in achieving e½ciency as any mechanism possibly can. In the simple exchange markets we have studied no mechanism converges to e½ciency at a rate that dominates the quadratic rate the double auction achieves.
Before reviewing these results in detail, two topics need discussion. First, the assertion above that strategy-proofness is impossible in a market setting needs documentation. Second, the impossibility of``exact'' strategy-proofness implies that the appropriate way to explore the possibility of``approximate'' strategy-proofness is by modeling the market in question as a game of in-complete information and examining the nature of the equilibria. With these preliminaries complete, I review the convergence results we have obtained for double auctions and then conclude with a brief discussion of some of the questions that these answers raise.
Strategy-proofness within a market
The standard, social choice formulation of strategy-proofness is this. There is a group of m V 2 individuals and a set X fx; y; z; . . .g of n V 3 alternatives among which they must choose one. Each individual i has a complete and transitive preference ordering R i on X where, by notational convention, P i is the strict, not necessarily complete ordering that R i implies. Every ordering R i of X is admissible; let W be the set of these possible orderings of X. The group uses the social choice function C : W m 3 X to make its choice: C maps pro®les of reported preferences R R 1 ; . . . ; R m A W m to a single alternative x A X .
De®ne the notation R Ài ;R i to refer to the pro®le R with, for individual i, the orderingR i substituted for R i . The social choice function C is strategyproof if no pro®le R A W m , no individual i, and no orderingR i A W exists such that
i.e., no pro®le R exists at which i by reportingR i can force selection of the alternative CR Ài ;R i that he prefers to CR. If a social choice function is strategy-proof, then every individual's dominant strategy is to report his true preference ordering R i . Strategy-proofness is attractive because it removes game theory ± and its problematic predictions ± from the group decision problem. Given this formulation the standard impossibility theorem for strategy-proof mechanisms is that no non-dictatorial, strategy-proof social choice function C exists whose range includes every element of X.3
The standard theorem does not apply to markets because the market environment naturally imposes structure on preferences, so the set of admissible preferences for an individual is some proper subset of W. For example, consider a size m market with m sellers and m buyers in which the traders are assumed to have transferrable utility. Speci®cally, the seller's utility is
where c i A 0; 1 is the opportunity cost she incurs in selling the widget, d i A f0; 1g is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if she does not sell her widget (i.e., keeps it) and 0 if she sells it, and s i A R is the monetary transfer she receives. Thus if she sells her widget at price p, then her utility is p À c i while if she does not sell her widget and neither makes nor receives a transfer, her utility is 0. Similarly, a buyers's utility is
where v j A 0; 1 is the value he realizes in buying the widget, l j A f0; 1g is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if he purchases the widget and 0 if he fails to purchase it, and t j A R is the monetary transfer he receives.4 Note that these utility functions have only c i and v j as parameters; consequently c i and v j fully describe the seller and buyer's preferences respectively. Feasibility implies that the set of alternatives among which the social choice function selects is
where the constraints follow from three facts: only m widgets are available for trade, no outside source of funds is available to subsidize the market, and widgets and money are freely disposable. X ÃÃ obviously has an in®nite number of elements; thus W, the set of all possible orderings on this set X ÃÃ of alternatives, is inconceivably large. This contrasts with the situation here: given that c i and v j are a priori restricted to the unit interval and parameterize the admissible utility functions u S c i ; Á and u B v j ; Á, the sets W The importance of this is that if the set of admissible preferences are small compared to W, then the possibilities for constructing a strategy-proof social choice function are enhanced because there are a limited number of orderingŝ R i A W ÃÃ S available for a seller to choose among in order to manipulate the outcome in her favor. Barbera Á and Jackson (1995) have written a remarkable paper characterizing the strategy-proof social choice functions that exist for an exchange economy: each of the m agents receives an endowment of the l goods that exist in the economy, each agent has a strictly quasi-concave, continuous, and increasing utility function u i on R l (denote this class of utility functions as W Ã ), and the social choice function prescribes a set of net trades among the agents as a function of their reported utility functions. Their main result (Theorem 3) shows that limiting admissible preferences to W Ã does succeed in expanding the class of strategy-proof social choice functions beyond dictatorial functions.5 Speci®cally, the theorem establishes that, in this market 4 Normally t j < 0 if l j 1, for if the buyer succeeds in buying the widget, then Àt j is the price he pays for it. 5 Two comments are merited concerning dictatorial social choice functions. First, a dictatorial social choice function is not anonymous because it identi®es a particular individual as the dictator. Second, within a market setting a dictatorial social choice function can be quite complex because agent i only cares about his own allocation, not the allocations of other agents. This restriction permits the construction of strategyproof social choice functions that are serially dictatorial. In a serially dictatorial social choice function a ®xed hierarchy of agents exists. The ®rst agent at the top of the heirarchy (the top level dictator) chooses his most preferred allocation from a set that is exogenously ®xed as part of the functions's de®nition. The next agent down the heirarchy (the second level dictator) chooses his most preferred allocation from a set that is setting, an anonymous, non-bossy social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it prescribes anonymous ®xed proportion trading.6 A social choice function is anonymous if the net trades prescribed to an agent do not depend on the identity of that individual. It is non-bossy only if an agent must change his own allocation in order to a¨ect another agent's allocation.
What is anonymous ®xed proportion trading and, given that, what do we really gain from limiting admissible preferences from W, the set of all possible orderings of R l , to W Ã , the set of strictly quasi-concave, continuous, and increasing utility functions on R l ? Fixed proportion trading is complicated to de®ne in general; consequently I demonstrate it here within the simple supplydemand example developed above using four traders (two sellers and two buyers). This simplicity does have a cost: the only if part of Barbera Á and Jackson's theorem does not apply to this example because it involves restricting preferences to a small subset of W Ã .7 The two sellers have costs c 1 ; c 2 A 0; 1 and the two buyers have values v 1 ; v 2 A 0; 1. E½ciency requires that the two widgets, initially owned by the two sellers, be assigned to the two traders who have the highest values. Thus if the preference pro®le is c 1 0:3, c 2 0:8, v 1 0:6, and v 2 0:4, as is shown in Example 1 of Fig. 1 , then e½ciency requires buyer 1 and seller 2 be assigned the two widgets, i.e., e½ciency requires buyer 1 and seller 1 to trade. The simplest member of the ®xed proportions class of trading rules is the ®xed price rule.8 Given an a priori chosen, ®xed price p F , the rule prescribes that every buyer who reports a valuation greater than p F trades, every seller who reports a cost less than p F trades, and if the market demand and supply does not balance at p F , then the long side of the market is rationed by random draw.9 It is strategy-proof because no agent can a¨ect the terms of trade. Let, a function top level dictator's choice, etc. Such functions are strategy-proof because no pair of agents mutually a¨ects the set of alternatives from which each chooses; therefore no strategic interaction exists. 6 The class of social choice functions and environments that they consider is restricted to include only functions and environments that satisfy two technical conditions: tiefreeness and a restriction on the inequality of endowments. 7 W ÃÃ S and W ÃÃ B , the sets of preference orderings this example admits, is drastically restricted from W Ã , the set with which Jackson and Barbera Á work. Therefore their characterization may be incomplete for these sets, and in fact it is. McAfee (1992) has devised a clever strategy-proof mechanism that uses dual prices, runs a surplus, and is not identi®ed by Barbera Á and Jackson's theorem. Williams (1998) , however, has shown that this restriction of preferences is not su½cient to permit the construction of an e½cient and strategy-proof mechanism.
for the examples that follow, p F 0:5. In Example 1 the ®xed price rule achieves e½ciency, for seller 1 does sell to buyer 1 as e½ciency requires.
The ®xed proportions rule requires that three prices be given a priori: p B3 > p 2 > p S3 . The procedure for choosing among these prices is:
1. If exactly 3 traders (whether buyers or sellers is irrelevant) have valuations/ costs greater than p B3 , then the price is ®xed at p B3 , and trade ± including necessary rationing ± is conducted at that price exactly as in the ®xed price rule. 2. If exactly 2 traders have valuations/costs greater than p 2 , then the price is ®xed at p 2 , and trade is conducted at that price exactly as in the ®xed price rule. Or, equivalently, if exactly 2 traders have valuations/costs less than p 2 , then the price is ®xed at p 2 , and trade is conducted at that price exactly as in the ®xed price rule. 3. If exactly 3 traders have valuations/costs less than p S3 , then the price is ®xed at p S3 , and trade is conducted at that price exactly as in the ®xed price rule. 4. If none of the above apply, then no trade occurs.
This rule is strategy-proof because any trader who successfully shifts the price in his favor through misrepresentation of his true preferences necessarily causes himself to be excluded from trading. To demonstrate the rule, let the three prices p B3 , p 2 , and p S3 be, as shown in Fig. 1, 0 .75, 0.50, and 0.25 respectively. Applying these rules to Example 1 results in the price p 2 0:5 being ®xed because exactly two traders have valuations greater than p 2 . The e½cient allocation then ensues exactly as with the ®xed price rule.
Examples 2 and 3 show how the ®xed proportions rule di¨ers from the ®xed price rule. In Example 2 the ®xed proportions rule prescribes no trade because only 2 traders have valuations/costs greater than p B3 while 3 traders have valuations greater than p 2 . The ®xed price rule does better: seller 1 sells his widget to either buyer 1 with probability 0.5 or buyer 2 with probability 0.5. Neither rule, however is e½cient; that requires buyer 1 to trade with seller 1. The situation reverses in Example 3. There the ®xed proportions rule selects price p B3 because 3 traders have valuations greater than p B3 . This results in seller 1 selling her widget and buyers 1 and 2 being rationed randomly. This rationing is not e½cient, for buyer 1, with his value being greater than buyer 2's value, should trade with certainty.
These examples illustrate two points: neither rule is e½cient and neither rule dominates the other. With respect to the ®rst point it has long been known that severe di½culties exist in obtaining both strategy-proofness and e½ciency in market settings. Hurwicz (1972) devised the initial demonstration of the incompatibility of the two requirements for a two good-two agent model of an exchange economy. Hurwicz and Walker (1990) show the impossibility of strategy-proof, e½cient mechanisms for exchange economies in which agents are restricted to have quasi-linear preferences. Barbera Á and Jackson (1995) , as we have been discussing, characterize the class of anonymous, non-bossy, and strategy-proof social choice functions that exist for a very general class of exchange economies and observe that the resulting rules are not e½cient. Schummer (1997) has recently shown that for the case of two agents even the extreme step of restricting preferences to be linear is not su½cient to obtain both strategy-proofness and e½ciency. Therefore, even though a completely general theorem has not yet been formulated and proved, it seems clear that no attractive social choice functions exist for market settings that are both strategy-proof and e½cient.
With respect to the second point, Examples 2 and 3 show that neither the ®xed price nor the ®xed proportions rule is more e½cient than the other for all possible preference pro®les. A simple tabulation of the possibilities reveals that situations such as Example 2, in which the ®xed proportions rule leads to no-trade and the ®xed price rule realizes some of the available gains from trade, are much more prevalent than situations such as Example 3, in which the ®xed proportions rule realizes gains from trade and the ®xed price rule leads to no-trade.10 This observation suggests that the ®xed proportions rule, 10 The reason is that the event``exactly three traders reporting costs/values greater than p B3 or exactly two traders reporting values/costs greater than p 2 or exactly three traders reporting values/costs less than p S3 '' is a quite restrictive event and can easily fail to be realized even when trade should occur. despite the apparent¯exibility it imparts on price, may in fact perform more poorly in terms of e½ciency than the ®xed price rule with its single price. Thus our deep and extremely ingenious explorations of the possibilities for constructing strategy-proof social choice functions in market environments have brought little reward in terms of discovering usable mechanisms.11
Return now to the question that I posed at the beginning: Why is price theory, which implicitly assumes truthful revelation of preferences, such a robust explanation for the prices that we observe in markets? This short review has shown that it is not and can not be that market mechanisms are strategy-proof. Yet, as price theory's success suggests, people often act as if markets were strategy-proof. How can this paradox be resolved?
3 Strategy-proofness, games of incomplete information, and mechanism design Given that market mechanisms are not and can not be strategy-proof and given that price theory does a pretty fair job of explaining prices without any reference to traders' e¨orts to manipulate the outcome, then how should the trading process be modeled so that the apparent unimportance of strategic behavior in the price setting process be investigated rather than assumed. My starting point is the observation that if a social choice function C is not strategy-proof, as is normally the case in a market setting, then each individual's best response to other agents is a function of their preferences. This follows directly from the de®nition of manipulability: given that the mechanism C is not strategy-proof, then an individual i, pro®le R A W m , and orderinĝ R i A W exist such that
which is to say that if s i : W m 3 W is i's best response correspondence, then
This almost trivial observation has a deeper implication: each individual has good reason to be uncertain about other individuals' preferences. To see this, let c be the manipulable social choice function a group is using and suppose that whatever preference pro®le R A W m is realized all m individuals believe they know every other individual's preferences. Given a realized preference pro®le R A W, the reported preference pro®le is the complete information Nash equilibrium, SR.12 Therefore the composition of c and S gives 11 I use the word``our'' literally, for I participated in one of the earlier e¨orts. See Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . 12 I am assuming here that the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies and that, if multiple equilibria exist, S makes a selection among them. If the function f were one for which, for some pro®le R, only mixed strategy equilibria exist, then this argument would have to be recast using a characterization of strategy-proofness for social choice functions that speci®y lotteries as well as singletons. Gibbard (1978) , for example, characterized such functions for the standard social choice setting of a discrete set of alternative with no a priori structure on the admissible orderings. the outcome; let this function be CR 1 cSR. The function C is itself a social choice function and, unless c and S have a very fortuitous structure, C is not strategy-proof. But if C is not strategy-proof, then an individual i, a preference pro®le R, and orderingR i exists such that (4) holds. The interpretation of (4) here is that if agent i anticipates that pro®le R is likely to be realized and if he can mislead everyone else into believing that his preferences areR i and not R i , then he can secure the outcome CR Ài ;R i , not the outcome CR that he prefers less according to his true preferences R i .13 In other words, agent i manipulates the social choice by manipulating others' beliefs about his preferences.
This possibility of manipulating other individual actions by misleading them in the formation of their beliefs suggests two complementary observations.
. This type of manipulation is common in the everyday world. Consider three examples. A frequent, and sometimes e¨ective way of bargaining is for the buyer to convince the seller that he does not care very strongly for the good that is being o¨ered in the expectation that she will reduce the asking price in order to clinch the deal. The essence of a con®dence man's swindle is to convince the victim absolutely that he has her best interests at heart. Similarly, an assistant professor may seek to convince his senior colleagues that he has a more genuine love for scholarship than in fact he does, for that belief may make his colleagues more willing to grant tenure with its commitment of lifetime employment.
. Most people have been manipulated in exactly this way. Few of us are not gullible on occasion. A reasonable response to such experiences is to become more cautious in believing that one really knows what another person's preferences are. As a consequence, I would assert, experienced and rational people tend to be retain a degree of scepticism about the preferences of even people they know quite well. This is especially true for a person in a position of authority, for she certainly realizes that the people over whom she has some measure of power tend to tell her what she wants to hear.
The implication of these observations for understanding the robustness of price theory is straightforward: any adequate theory must explicitly take into account the uncertainty traders have concerning other traders' preferences and explain how the market mechanism successfully extracts this preference information even as it uses this information to allocate the widgets being traded.14 The essence of the exchange problem is asymmetric information about preferences.
The obvious way to proceed, which I follow, is to model trade as a Bayesian game of incomplete information and to derive its equilibrium properties. This, however, is not the only way to proceed. For example, Jackson and Manelli (1997) use less structure on beliefs than the Bayesian game approach requires and show how an exchange economy must converge to a competitive equilibrium as the number of agents become large. The generality of their results, however, exacts a price: they do not derive any rates at which equilibrium allocations converge to an e½cient allocation as the economy grows. Therefore they can not give an indication as to how big a market must be in order to be approximately competitive.
Before turning to a discussion of the results that have been achieved in the Bayesian game framework, one additional modeling issue should be discussed. Mechanism design theory is a marvelous tool that has been developed over the past 20 years that allows us to understand a host of issues involving asymmetric information. It, however, is not directly useful here, for it assumes that the mechanism designer as well as the participants share common knowledge of the underlying distribution F of preferences. Taking the prior distribution F as given, the mechanism designer might construct, for example, a social choice function C : W ÃÃ S m Â W ÃÃ B m 3 X ÃÃ such that it maximizes the ex ante expected gains from trade subject to the constraints of:
. Incentive compatibility, which requires that each trader's Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy be to report his true cost/value, . Interim individual rationality, which requires that each trader's expected utility conditional on his cost/value be nonnegative, and . Ex ante budget balancing, which requires that the expectation of the summed monetary transfers S i s i S j t j be nonpositive.
As long as the underlying prior distribution F remains constant C remains constrained e½cient and this works well. If, however, the underlying prior should change from F toF , then one of two things happens:
. The social choice function C remains ®xed, and as a consequence of the distribution changing from F toF , each agent changes his strategy and honest revelation of preferences is no longer necessarily a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. There is no reason to think that the resulting equilibrium achieves, or comes close to achieving, the same constrained e½ciency as the original equilibrium did for the original distribution F.
. The mechanism designer reoptimizes the social choice function from C tô C based on his understanding of what the new distribution is. If the new priorF is common knowledge among everyone, agents and mechanism designer alike, then the redesign is successful and there is nothing more to be said. If, however, the mechanism designer does not share in the common knowledge among the traders that the distribution is nowF , then it is unclear how he can possibly obtain the needed information from the selfinterested agents. The mechanism C is only designed to elicit preferences information given common knowledge of the underlying distribution, not to elicit information sequentially about the agents' beliefs about each other and then about their individual, private preferences.
An appropriate approach to avoid these conundrums is to abandon the mechanism design approach of tailoring the mechanism to a speci®c environment and instead to pick C so that, in some sense, it performs well no matter what the distribution of preferences turns out to be. This is the approach that Wilson (1987, p. 36 ) has advocated, observing that the rules of a market``are not changed as the environment changes; rather they persist as stable, viable institutions.'' I now turn to showing that the double auction ful®lls this goal. While neither strategy-proof nor e½cient, it is approximately strategy-proof even for moderately sized markets and approaches full ex post e½ciency with surprising speed as the market grows in size.
Properties of the double auction

Model
The double auction is a simple operationalization of supply and demand as a one-shot game that Aldo Rustichini, Steven Williams, and I have studied. There are m sellers, each of whom owns a single, indivisible widget, and m buyers, each of whom might like to purchase a single widget. For a given seller i the widget's opportunity cost, which must be met if she is to be willing to transfer it, is c i . This cost is private to her; the other 2m À 1 traders believe that her cost c i was independently drawn from the distribution F Á on the unit interval 0; 1. For a given buyer j the widget's value is v i ; the other 2m À 1 traders believe that it was drawn independently from the distribution GÁ on 0; 1. We assume that F and G are C 1 and that their densities f and g respectively are bounded above by the positive constant q and below by the positive constant q. The pair F ; G, which we call the market's environment, along with the rules of the double auction and the strategies of each trader are common knowledge.
The sequence of ®ve events that constitute a double auction are:
1. The sellers and buyers all independently draw their costs c i and values v j . Each trader's cost/value is private information to that trader. 2. Simultaneously sellers and buyers submit o¨ers and bids that are functions of their costs/values. Speci®cally, S i c i is seller i's o¨er when her cost is c i and the function S i : 0; 1 3 0; 1 is her strategy. Exactly parallel, B j v j is buyer j's bid when his value is v j and the function B j : 0; 1 3 0; 1 is his strategy. 3. Given the o¨ers and bids a market clearing price is set. Sort the 2m o¨ers/ bids from lowest to highest,
and ®x the price at
which is market clearing with respect to traders' reported costs and values.15 4. Assign the m widgets to the m traders that made the m highest o¨ers/bids.
Each buyer who acquires a widget pays p and each seller who relinquishes a widget receives p. Consistent with the utility functions (1) and (2) a seller who sells her widget realizes utility p À c i , and a buyer who purchases a widget realizes utility v j À p. Sellers and buyers who do not succeed in trading realize 0 utility. Note that summing the traders' utilities gives the total gains from trade that the double auction realizes. 5. The market disperses. Traders do not have another chance to either purchase or sell widgets.
The one-shot nature of the game is crucial, for if it were repeated, then each trader's opportunity cost of trading would not be c i or v j , but would be a transformation of c i or v j re¯ecting future opportunities to trade, perhaps at a better price. Modeled in this manner the double auction is a game of incomplete information and the appropriate solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies, hS 1 ; . . . ; S m ; B 1 ; . . . ; B m i is an equilibrium if (i), for each seller i and for each possible cost c i A 0; 1, the o¨er S i c i is a best response to the strategies of the 2m À 1 other traders and (ii), for each buyer j and for each possible value v j A 0; 1, the bid B j v j is a best response to the strategies of the 2m À 1 other traders. From the viewpoint of an individual trader the bids and o¨ers of the other traders are random variables because their costs and values are private information. Therefore, given the strategies of the other traders, an o¨er S i c i is a best response if it maximizes the expected utility of seller i when her cost is c i . Similarly a bid B j v j is a best response if it maximizes buyer j's expected utility when his value is v j .
We only consider symmetric equilibria in which all sellers play the same strategy SÁ and all buyers play the same strategy BÁ. We also only consider equilibria in which trade occurs with positive probability and equilibria in which sellers always ask at least as much as their cost and buyers o¨er no more than their value.16 This structure implies that in equilibrium (i) sellers and buyers' strategies are strictly increasing over the relevant domains and (ii) a tie between a bid and an o¨er is a zero probability event.
15 More generally price can be set anywhere in the interval s m ; s m1 of possible market clearing prices according to the formula, p 1 À ks m ks m1 , where k A 0; 1 is a ®xed parameter that is common knowledge. 16 The ®rst part of this statement rules out the uninteresting no-trade equilibrium in which each seller, no matter what her cost is, asks for a price 1 and each buyer, no what his value is, demands a price 0. The second part of the statement rules out dominated strategies in which, for instance, a seller with cost c H i that is near the right end of the interval 0; 1 o¨ers to sell her widget for less than her cost Sc
Her equilibrium strategy S might validly specify such an o¨er because in equilibrium the highest bid any buyer will make is B1, which will be strictly less than 1, and if Sc H i > B1, then her o¨er will never be accepted, i.e., the dominated o¨er Sc H i is costless for her to make.
Given an environment F ; G and a selected equilibrium hS; Bi for a size m market, the double auction's relative ine½ciency is
where (i) G m F ; G is the ex ante expected gains from trade if each trader acted as if the double auction were strategy-proof and reported their true costs/ values, thus guaranteeing an ex post e½cient outcome in which all potential gains from trade are always realized, and (ii) f DA m F ; G is the ex ante expected gains from trade that the selected equilibrium achieves. In short, ef DA m ; F ; G is the proportion of the possible gains from trade that the double auction's selected equilibrium hS; Bi fails to achieve in expectation.
Approximate strategy-proofness of the double auction
The main theorem that Rustichini, Williams, and I proved concerning equilibria of double auction is this.17 Theorem 1. (Rustichini et al 1994) . Given an environment F ; G, continuous, positive functions kq; q and xq; q exist such that, for all market sizes m V 2 and all equilibria hS; Bi of the double auction,
for all c i A 0; c,
for all v i A v; 1, and
Inequalities (6) and (7) say that in equilibrium the maximal amount by which traders misrepresent their costs/values ± i.e., misrepresent their preferences ± is cut in half each time the market's size doubles. Note that these bounds apply to all possible equilibria, even equilibria with discontinuous strategies if such equilibria should exist. Inequality (8) says that the maximal relative ine½-ciency of equilibria is cut by a factor of four each time the market's size doubles.
The driving force behind the bounds (6) and (7) on strategic misrepresentation can be explained as follows. Taking the viewpoint of a buyer, his gain 17 In their statement of the theorem the bounds q; q on the densities f and g do not appear. They are added here because they are necessary in the statement of Theorem 2 below. It is a tedious but straightfoward exercise to go through the proofs and derive how the constants k and x depend on q; q. from misrepresenting his value v i downward is to try to force the market clearing price p downward. But, given the rule (5) for computing p, he can only do this if his bid is the m 1st highest among the 2m bids and o¨ers.18 The probability of being the m 1st highest o¨er/bid is roughly proportional to 1 m , i.e., it decreases quickly with market size. On the other hand the cost of misrepresenting is that he may be ine½ciently excluded from trading, which occurs if Bv i < p < v i . For a given magnitude of misrepresentation, v i À Bv i , the probability of being excluded does not necessarily decrease with market size, but may actually increase because the standard deviation of p around the limit competitive price is proportional to 1 m p . The bounds (6) and (7) in e¨ect represent a balance, as m increases, between the decreasing expected gains from misrepresentation and the costs of misrepresentation. Figure 2 shows for the uniform environment (i.e., F and G are both the uniform distribution) the e¨ect of these bounds by graphing a representative bundle of equilibrium strategies for markets of sizes 2, 4, and 8 respectively.19 The horizontal axis represents traders' costs/values and the vertical axis represents their o¨ers/bids. The 45 diagonal line represents truth-telling. If the double auction were strategy-proof, then that line would be the graph of every trader's strategy. Their strategic behavior, however, implies that an equilibrium consists of a pair of lines, one above the diagonal that graphs the strategies of sellers in that particular equilibrium and one below the diagonal that graphs the strategies of buyers in that equilibrium. Comparison of the three panels for di¨erent market sizes shows two e¨ects of increasing market size: (i) traders' strategies approach truth-telling and (ii) the bundles of strategies rapidly become smaller. Point (ii) is interesting because it suggests that in an important sense as m becomes large the double auction has an essentially unique equilibrium.
Figure 3 ± a Harberger triangle ± supplies intuition as to why the linear bounds (6) and (7) on misrepresentation lead to the quadratic bound (8) on relative ine½ciency. Let the environment be the uniform environment. The SS and DD curves represent the expected number of widgets sold per seller and purchased per buyer, i.e., SS and DD are the expected per capita supply and demand curves for a double auction in the uniform environment. If the double auction were strategy-proof and if traders reported their true costs/values, then at point A the expected market price would be p 0:5, the expected per capita quantity would be q 0:5, and the allocation would be ex post e½cient.
But . The constrained e½cient mechanism in which mechanism design theory has been used to tailor the mechanism to minimize its relative ine½ciency subject to three constraints: incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and ex ante budget balancing.
. The double auction. The two values shown for its relative ine½ciency are the minimum and maximum ine½ciencies found within a representative bundle of equilibria.
. The ®xed price rule with the ®xed price set at the competitive price, p 0:5, of the limit market with m y. Inspection of the table shows that for m as small as 6 or 8 both the constrained e½cient mechanism and the double auction are essentially ex post e½cient. Consequently strategic behavior within the double auction is not a practical issue for markets even as small as that. This last observation, that for m on the order of 6 or 8 strategic behavior is inconsequential, is the answer that I o¨er to the question I originally posed: why is price theory so robust even though it ignores the possibility of strategic behavior? This model of double auction mediated trade suggests that the e¨ects of strategic behavior attenuate so quickly as the size of the market increases that it is a good and justi®able approximation to ignore its existence even in moderate sized markets.
The double auction achieves this excellent performance by being approximately strategy-proof in moderate and larger sized markets. Without o¨ering a formal de®nition, I suggest that it is approximately strategy proof in two senses. First, as m increases equilibrium strategies converge towards truthtelling at a fast rate. Thus, for moderate sized and greater m, equilibria are almost strategy-proof in the sense that the equilibrium behavior of every trader is to reveal almost his true preferences. Second, if traders are boundedly rational (or just lazy), then substituting the focal strategy of truthful revelation for the equilibrium strategies is a reasonable decision since, for all but genuinely small markets, truthful revelation is an e-equilibrium that, additionally, happens to be ex post e½cient. Moreover it is an e-equilibrium that is immune to the di½culty that Gul and Postlewaite (1992, p. 1284 ) raise concerning such e-equilibria:
. . . while approximately optimal behavior may result in e½cient outcomes, this certainly does not imply that precisely optimal behavior will result in approximately optimal outcomes. The cumulative e¨ect of many agents' adjustments from approximately optimal behavior to optimal behavior, the subsequent adjustments to these adjustments, etc., can be large.
For the double auction we know that these adjustments are small and that precisely optimal behavior leads to an equilibrium that is close to the truthful revelation outcome. Thus even if some traders precisely optimize and others treat the double auction as strategy-proof and truthfully reveal, the outcome remains quite satisfactory from a welfare perspective.
Worst-case asymptotic optimality of the double auction
The above discussion establishes that the double auction performs exceedingly well. Nevertheless if one is to paste the label``approximately strategy-proof '' onto it for moderately sized and larger markets, then one would like to know that there is not some other allocation mechanism C that is usable across a variety of environment F ; G and that dominates the double auction in the quickness of the convergence of its equilibria to ex post e½ciency. In recent work Steven Williams and I (1999) have shown that in a well de®ned sense this is not a issue: an environment F ; G exists in which the double auction's rate of convergence to e½ciency is equal to the rate at which the best possible allocation mechanism asymptotically converges to e½ciency.
The framework for this result is as follows. Let the set of admissible environments F ; G be E. A market game f m for a size m market consists of a strategy set for each of the m sellers and m buyers, an outcome function that maps strategy pro®les into allocations, and an equilibrium selection rule that for each environment in E picks a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the market game. A market mechanism F over E is a sequence of market games for each possible market size m V 2; thus F ff 2 ; f 3 ; . . .g. Let f m F ; G be the ex ante expected gains from trade that the market game f m generates in the environment F ; G and, as before, let the mechanism's relative ine½ciency be
The worst-case relative ine½ciency of the market game f m over the admissible environments E is e wor f m ; E sup
It is the relative ine½ciency of f m in that environment F ; G A E that maximizes that ine½ciency. Given a set of admissible environments E and a set of market mechanisms M that are de®ned on E, a market mechanism F ff 2 ; f 3 ; . . .g A M is worstcase asymptotic optimal over E among market mechanisms in M if, for any
. . .g A M, a constant h > 0 exists such that e wor f m ; E U he wor f Ã m ; E for all m V 2. In other words, the market mechanism F is worst-case asymptotic optimal if no other market mechanism F Ã exists such that, for each market size m A f2; 3; 4; . . .g, the ratio between (i) its relative ine½ciency in the environment within E it ®nds most di½cult and (ii) F Ã 's relative ine½ciency in the environment that F Ã ®nds most di½cult is bounded by a ®nite constant. Said yet another way, F is worst case asymptotic optimal if no other mechanism has worst-case relative ine½ciency that converges to zero at a faster rate than the double auction's worst case relative ine½ciency.
Given this setup, the following theorem is true.
Theorem 2. Satterthwaite and Williams (1999) . Let E be a set of admissible environments F ; G such that (i) the uniform environment G U :F U is included, (ii) the densities f ; g for every element of E satisfy qU f ; g U q for positive q; q, and (iii), for every environment F ; G A E, an equilibrium with positive probability of trade exists. Let M be the class of all interim individually rational and ex ante budget balancing market mechanisms. The double auction is worstcase asymptotic optimal over the environments E among the class M of market mechanisms.
The proof of this theorem involves using mechanism design theory and, in particular, a new form for the incentive constraints that Williams (1998) developed. We show that, for the uniform environment, the relative ine½-ciency of the constrained e½cient mechanism, F CE ff CE 2 ; f CE 3 ; . . .g, approaches 0 no faster than the relative ine½ciency of the double auction, i.e., a x > 0 exists such that
No other mechanism in the class of interim individually rational and ex ante budget balancing market mechanisms can converge faster than this on the uniform environment. Equilibria of the double auction converge at least that fast on the uniform environment and on any other environment that meets the conditions of Theorem 1. Together the last two statements imply the theorem.
While market mechanisms may exist that have a faster than quadratic rate of convergence on some environments within E, for such mechanisms the uniform environment is the``worst'' case that is needed to make the theorem true. That the uniform environment plays the role of worst case is nice because the uniform case is anything but pathological. Our conjecture is that there are no mechanisms that converge at a faster than quadratic rate in any but pathological environments.
Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to make two main points. The ®rst is that the double auction has remarkable properties when applied to a simple exchange market: in equilibrium the maximal misrepresentation of preferences is inversely proportional to the market's size, the relative ine½ciency is inversely proportional to the square of the market's size, and no other mechanism dominates this rate of convergence to e½ciency. These results provide a justi®cation for price theory's disregard of strategic behavior. The second, meta-point is that strategy-proofness in its exact form is too strong. There have been a few positive results such as Barbera Á, Sonnenschein, and Zhou's (1991) ``Voting by Committees'' in which they found interesting and useful strategy-proof voting rules for a common group choice problem. Nevertheless the empirical prediction based on the many papers characterizing strategy-proof mechanisms must be that for almost all settings that remain to be explored no interesting strategyproof mechanisms exist. Rather than continuing this program of characterizing strategy-proof mechanisms in more settings, it may be better to seek out approximately strategy-proof mechanisms.
The approach that I described above is only one possible direction for pursuing approximate strategy-proofness. For example, Kalai and Ledyard (1998) have shown how placing the group choice problem in a long run, repeated setting can be used to generate an approximately, or even exactly, strategy-proof mechanism. The work of Saari (1995) and Merlin and Saari (1997) on the geometry of voting suggests that it may be possible to determine the rate at which possibilities for manipulation decrease as the number of voters and alternatives increase. Bartholdi and Olin (1991) and Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1992) use complexity theory to show that computing whether manipulation is possible in a particular situation can be a NP-hard problem, thus suggesting that a convincing theory of approximate strategyproofness might be based on bounded rationality.
